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Introduction 
James Pendergast wanted to contest $20 worth of roaming fees that 
Sprint had charged him, as these charges were incurred from calls in 
his own home.1 Pendergast filed a class action on behalf of Sprint 
customers who had noticed the same issue only to learn, when his suit 
was thrown out of a Miami court, that Sprint included an arbitration 
clause in its form.2 Pendergast was like many consumers who have no 
idea they agreed to arbitrate all disputes, as well as waive a right to 
join any actions, when entering into these types of “take it or leave it” 
contracts.3 In this situation, Pendergast’s lawyer advised him that 
 
1. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/CPZ8-6TFQ]. 
2. Id. 
3. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 24, 2016) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1240) (prohibiting credit card issuers from 
including mandatory arbitration clauses as a tactic to prevent class-action 
lawsuits). The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection conducted a study 
in which it found that “[w]hen asked if they could participate in class-action 
lawsuits against their credit card issuer, more than half of the respondents 
whose contracts had pre-dispute arbitration agreements thought they could 
participate (56.7 percent).” Id. at 32843. The same study analyzed 
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winning would require expensive expert analysis, which Pendergast 
could not risk in arbitration, absent joining a class.4 Consequently, 
Pendergast declined to pursue any action to recover the $20, and Sprint 
was not held to account for its inconsistent roaming charges in the 
Miami market.5 
Consumer advocates have long argued that the ability to bring class 
actions in arbitration is essential to guarding against such corporate 
malfeasance.6 Thus, some have noted, with undisguised horror, that 
with the DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia7 decision, the Supreme Court has 
seemingly put the final nail in the class-arbitration coffin, first 
constructed with the Court’s Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.8 holding in 2010.9 A close examination of the 
DIRECTV opinion, however, suggests that the Court was more con-
cerned with the California court’s blatant disregard of the AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion10 holding than in broadening an anti-class 
arbitration policy.11 Indeed, in looking closely at the Concepcion line of 
 
arbitration contracts throughout the financial services market and found 
that “85 percent to 100 percent of the contracts with arbitration 
agreements—covering over 99 percent of market share subject to arbitration 
in the six product markets studied—included such no-class-arbitration 
provisions.” Id. at 32842. 
4. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1. 
5. Id.  
6. See Ellen Meriwether, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Rule 23 Amendments: 
Are Class Actions on the Precipice?, 30 Antitrust 23, 24 (2016) (noting 
that “the choice is not between a class case and an individual action but 
between a class action and no action at all”). 
7. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
8. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
9. Id. at 687 (holding that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not 
agreed is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act); see Imre S. Szalai, 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme Court Used a Jedi Mind 
Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 Ohio St. J. On Disp. 
Resol. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (arguing that the “Court in 
DIRECTV reached a new low, a result so extreme and ‘dangerous,’ . . . [that 
the] decision turns arbitration law completely upside down”); see also Silver-
Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (quoting the Honorable William G. 
Young as saying that “business has a good chance of opting out of the legal 
system altogether and misbehaving without reproach”). 
10. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
11. See Greg Klass, First Do No Harm: The DIRECTV v. Imburgia Decision, 
New Priv. L. Blog (Dec. 15, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/ 
2015/12/15/first-do-no-harm-the-directv-v-imburgia-decision-greg-klass/ 
[https://perma.cc/A3YR-V4GM] (arguing that, even though the Court came 
to the wrong decision, Justice Breyer’s opinion did not adopt DIRECTV’s 
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cases, the DIRECTV holding is far more narrow than most commentary 
would suggest. 
Furthermore, the Consumer Financial Protection Board (“CFPB”), 
acting under the Congressional mandate provided by section 1028(b) of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
proposed a set of rules that would prohibit financial service providers 
from putting class action waivers in certain consumer agreements.12 
Some corporate lawyers are reacting with horror at the promulgation 
of these rules, and multiple legal challenges are likely.13 Although it is 
uncertain what a new Court might rule after the 2016 election and 
subsequent appointment of a 9th justice, the current iteration of the 
Court is more closely aligned in favor of allowing class-arbitrations than 
the lopsided DIRECTV majority would otherwise suggest. That 
balance is unlikely to shift, even if the Senate confirms a candidate in 
the mold of the late Justice Scalia, as seems likely at the time of 
publication.14 This Comment, therefore, posits that the Court could 
uphold the new CFPB rules against class action waivers, despite the 6–
3 DIRECTV decision.15 
 
argument for a presumption in favor of arbitration and did not create new 
law). 
12. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, § 1028(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2004 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C. 
5518) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a 
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for 
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds 
that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the 
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”). 
13. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule on Arbitration Would 
Restore Right to Sue Banks, N.Y. Times (May 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/business/dealbook/consumer-agency-
moves-to-assert-bank-customers-right-to-sue.html [https://perma.cc/E69U-
5TPQ] (quoting Alan S. Kaplinsky as saying that “[i]t’s going to spell the 
end of arbitration”); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: 
Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 623, 629 (2012) (characterizing legal challenges to CFPB 
regulations as “inevitable”). 
14. The Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch is President Trump’s nominee, and is 
likely to be confirmed. In a recent tribute to the late Justice Scalia, 
Gorsuch spoke at length of Scalia’s influence on his own approach to the 
judiciary. See Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and 
Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
905, 906 (2016). 
15. “Pro-arbitration” is in quotation marks because, despite the Court’s avowed 
favor towards arbitration, this Comment will discuss the overwhelming 
scholarly opinion which persuasively argues that the Court’s recent rulings 
fail to display a clear understanding of arbitration in practice. 
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In making that determination, Part I of this Comment will briefly 
examine the history of arbitration agreements and class-action waivers 
in consumer adhesion contracts. Part II will discuss how the Stolz-
Nielson line of cases, culminating in DIRECTV, have led to an apparent 
inability of consumers to circumvent class action waivers. Finally, Part 
III will briefly consider the likely future of such waivers in adhesion 
contracts, in light of the CFPB rules limiting class action waivers and 
arbitration clauses in certain financial services contracts. 
I. Arbitration and Class Actions 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and Consumer Contracts 
In 1925, Congress enacted the precursor to what is now known as 
the FAA, in order to enforce commercial arbitral agreements in front 
of a hostile judiciary.16 As codified into law, the enforcement scope of 
the FAA is limited to “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction.”17 This § 2 enforcement clause is the “heart of the FAA” 
which served to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration.18 It did so by 
putting arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contract law, as 
Congress intended when it enacted the statute.19 In the 1980s, however, 
the Court shifted from an “equal footing” to a “pro-arbitration” stance, 
when it stated that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration.”20 This judicial shift to-
wards “pro-arbitration”—in opposition to Congress’ explicit intention 
to create “equal footing”21—marked the beginning of a series of cases 
 
16. The FAA was called the U.S. Arbitration Act when President Calvin 
Coolidge signed it into law in 1925. It was renamed the Federal Arbitration 
Act in 1947, when it was reenacted. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: 
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L. J. 2804, 2861–62 (2015) (explaining the 
origin and constitutionality of the FAA). 
17. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
18. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 91, 92 (2012). 
19. Id. at 93 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924); S. Rep. No. 68-
536, at 2–3 (1924)). 
20. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (adopting both a pro-
arbitration stance, as well as broadening the application of the FAA to 
preempt state law). 
21. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (requiring enforcement of arbitration clauses); H.R. 
Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”). 
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where the Court misapplied the FAA when addressing the issue of class 
arbitration.22 
Congress certainly intended the FAA to facilitate arbitration be-
tween merchants and other parties with equal bargaining power, but 
did not express such an intention for the FAA to be applicable to ad-
hesion contracts.23 In fact, the legislative record indicates that Congress 
was concerned with that very possibility. In a lengthy exchange, mem-
bers of Congress discussed the danger that employers and corporations 
could use the FAA to impose mandatory arbitration in contracts where 
the other party did not have equal bargaining power, and explicitly 
stated that the FAA would not allow that to occur.24 Since Congress’ 
 
22. See Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class 
Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. Disp. Resol. 21, 21 (2012) (“[T]he 
U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of confusing and, at times, confused 
opinions on class arbitration.”). 
23. See id. at 26 (noting the differences between traditional arbitration disputes 
and those involving adhesion contracts); see, e.g., Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One rarely finds 
a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s.”). 
24. An exchange between a member of a sub-committee of the Senate 
Commission on the Judiciary and witness, over what eventually became the 
FAA, makes this concern over adhesion contracts clear: 
Mr. W. H. H. PIATT: . . . It is not intended that this shall be an act 
referring to labor disputes at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants 
the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as 
to what their damages are, if they want to do it. 
Senator WALSH of Montana: The trouble about the matter is that a 
great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not 
voluntary things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it. 
You can take that or you can leave it . . . . Either you can make that 
contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same with a good 
many contracts of employment. A man says “These are our terms. All 
right, take it or leave it.” Well, there is nothing for the man to do except 
to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the 
court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no 
confidence at all. 
Mr. PIATT: That would be the case in that kind of a case, I think; but 
it is not the intention of this bill to cover insurance cases.  
Mr. PIATT: . . . I would say I would not favor any kind of legislation that 
would permit the forcing of a man to sign that kind of contract . . . . 
Senator WALSH of Montana: You can see where they are not really 
voluntary contracts, in a strict sense. 
Mr. PIATT: I think that ought to be protested against, because it is the 
primary end of this contract that it is a contract between merchants one 
with another, buying and selling goods . . . . 
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enactment of the FAA, however, the judiciary has held that “both 
employment and consumer contracts constitute ‘commerce’ within the 
meaning of the FAA.”25 Nonetheless, until the 1980s, the Court did not 
consider arbitration agreements “operative when parties had signifi-
cantly different bargaining powers.”26 For example, in Wilko v. Swan,27 
the Court unanimously recognized that “the right to select the ‘forum’ 
even after the creation of a liability is a ‘substantial right’ and that the 
agreement, restricting that choice, would thwart the express purpose of 
the [federal] statute.”28 Thus, the Court recognized Congress’s concern 
over the significant risk to consumers incurred by imposing mandatory 
arbitration in adhesion contracts. 
In a series of holdings throughout the 1980s, however, the Court 
gradually abandoned the Wilko Court’s concerns over unequal bar-
gaining power between parties to an arbitration agreement and parties’ 
statutory right to legal recourse. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,29 the Court allowed for the arbitrability of 
antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. There, the Court held that 
there is no “presumption against arbitration of statutory claims . . . 
[nor] any reason to depart from the federal policy favoring arbitration 
where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded 
on statutory rights.”30 In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon,31 the Court upheld the arbitrability of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Securities 
Exchange Act claims by finding that the FAA requires the courts to 
rigorously enforce arbitration agreements and that “the burden is on 
 
 Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. 
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–10 (1923) (statement of W. H. 
H. Piatt). 
25. Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 309 (2nd ed. 
2014). 
26. Resnik, supra note 16, at 2862 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 
(1953) (“While a buyer and seller . . . under some circumstances[] may deal 
at arm’s length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted 
with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor.”)). See also 
Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 265 (1949) (finding that 
“contracts limiting the choice of venue are void as conflicting with the 
[Federal Employers’] Liability Act”). 
27. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
28. Id. at 438. 
29. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
30. Id. at 615. 
31. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
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the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”32 
Finally, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,33 
the Court ruled that claims under the Securities Act were arbitrable, 
even absent express consent.34 Thus, the Court gradually moved away 
from the notion of express consent, despite it being a central tenet of 
the practice of arbitration.35 
B. The Emergence of Class Actions in Arbitration 
As the Court began enforcing mandatory arbitration in adhesion 
contracts, arbitration clauses became well-nigh ubiquitous.36 
Corporations now use them in a variety of contexts, ranging from con-
sumer purchases, financial services to nursing home contracts. These 
form contracts are “provided to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it-
 
32. Id. at 226–27. 
33. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
34. Id. at 480–81 (overruling Wilko and its “steadily eroded” view toward 
arbitration). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (holding 
that the FAA supersedes state law). Southland also marked the beginning of 
unrestrained criticism of the Court’s rulings on arbitration, with Justice 
O’Connor’s blistering dissent: “Today’s decision is unfaithful to congressional 
intent, unnecessary, and, in light of the FAA’s antecedents and the 
intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable.” Id. at 36 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
35. Scholar Gary Born has noted that, regardless of what the parties choose to 
call their forum, it is “necessary to examine the substance of a dispute 
resolution provision to determine, objectively, whether it constitutes an 
agreement to arbitrate under applicable law.” Gary B. Born, 
International Arbitration: Law and Practice § 1.01A (2012). Born 
then goes on to state that “[w]ith some variations, virtually all authorities 
accept that arbitration is—and only is—a process by which parties 
consensually submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, 
selected by or for the parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute 
in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording each party an 
opportunity to present its case.” Id. (emphasis added). 
36. These clauses are generally considered mandatory because “they do not 
allow the consumer a means by which to opt out of the clause, and they 
become effective upon use or purchase.” Kristina A. Del Vecchio, Consumer 
Class Claims and Arbitration: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, Banking 
& Fin. Servs. Pol’y Rep., Oct. 2014, at 1. In addition, the CFPB found 
that, other than payday and private student loan agreements, most financial 
consumer contracts did not contain an “opt-out” provision, and the ones 
that did generally require all authorized users to sign and mail a document 
to the company, within a specific time. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 32830, 32842 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
1240). Even if the company included an opt-out provision, most consumers 
are unaware of that option. Id. at 32843. 
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basis,” which terms become operable at the point of purchase.37 Within 
twenty years of the Court overturning Wilko, arbitration clauses had 
even become common in employment contracts. A 2007 survey found 
that 46.8% of 757 responding companies used employment arbitration, 
up from only 4 out of 107 in 1991.38 This explosion of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in contracts between parties with unequal bargaining 
power thus fulfilled the very misgivings expressed by members of Con-
gress in the legislative record of 1924.39 
Section 2 of the FAA clearly requires party consent in order for an 
arbitration agreement to be binding, and the Court has continually 
underlined consent as an integral aspect of enforcing arbitration.40 
Courts, however, generally look only to the terms of the agreement in 
determining whether such consent is present.41 Even though many con-
sumers may be completely unaware that they have relinquished their 
rights to jury trials when accepting an adhesion contract, it is highly 
unlikely that a court would refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement 
on grounds of unconscionability.42 In fact, the Supreme Court has not 
found, in any case, that “arbitration [is] inadequate, inaccessible, or 
ineffective to vindicate rights.”43 
 
37. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer 
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Houston L. Rev. 1237, 1247 (2001). 
38. Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical 
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and 
Civil Litigation, 35 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 91, 95–96 (2014). 
39. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32835–36. 
40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (“[T]he first task of a court asked 
to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate that dispute.”). 
41. See Vernon v. Qwest Comm’ns Int’l, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Colo. 
2013) (enforcing an arbitration clause and class action waiver contained in 
a provider’s terms and conditions, even though the customers never signed 
the agreement, nor were provided paper copies of such); Alderman, supra 
note 37, at 1249 n.47 (citing numerous examples of the court finding 
consumer consent to adhesion contracts). 
42. In its study, the CFPB found that “[w]hen asked if they could participate in 
class action lawsuits against their credit card issuer, more than half of the 
respondents whose contracts had pre-dispute arbitration agreements thought 
they could participate (56.7 percent).” Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
32843. 
43. Resnik, supra note 16, at 2886; see, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80 (2000) (syllabus) (holding that an “agreement to 
arbitrate is not rendered unenforceable simply because it says nothing about 
arbitration costs, and thus fails to provide her protection from potentially 
substantial costs of pursuing her federal statutory claims in the arbitral 
forum”). The Court also “rejected generalized attacks on arbitration that rest 
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Despite the Court’s advocacy, it is not clear whether informed 
parties necessarily prefer forgoing their rights to litigation in favor of 
the efficiency of arbitration. A recent comparative study of consumer 
and nonconsumer contracts used by large public corporations showed 
that while over seventy-five percent of the consumer contracts included 
arbitration clauses, only six percent of the corporations’ nonemploy-
ment, nonconsumer contracts included mandatory arbitration.44 This 
data led the authors of the study to surmise, rather plausibly, that “the 
frequent use of arbitration clauses in the same firms’ consumer 
contracts may be an effort to preclude aggregate consumer action rather 
than, as often claimed, an effort to promote fair and efficient dispute 
resolution.”45 The disparity between the use of arbitration clauses in 
adhesion contracts, and the lack of such in negotiated contracts be-
tween parties with equal bargaining power also suggests that corpor-
ations may not prefer efficiency against the risk of forgoing the right to 
litigation for themselves.46 
In its shift away from the unanimous Wilko Court’s concerns over 
consent, the Court has focused on the avowed “simplicity, informality 
. . . of arbitration” and its “streamlined proceedings and expeditious 
results . . . [which] cause[s] parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes.”47 
In agreeing to arbitration, a party waives “a wide range of procedural 
rights and protections that it would otherwise be entitled to claim in a 
 
on ‘suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded 
in the substantive law.’” Id. at 89–90 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). 
44. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer 
and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 871, 882–83 (2008). 
45. Id. at 871. 
46. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: 
An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of 
Publicly Held Companies, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 335, 335 (2007) (noting that 
“[l]ittle evidence was found to support the proposition that [public companies 
that filed contracts with the SEC] routinely regard arbitration clauses as 
efficient or otherwise desirable contract terms”). However, in discussing this 
study, scholars Drahozal and Ware caution against reading too large an 
inference from its results “[be]cause the litigation process receives government 
subsidies, sophisticated parties can be expected to agree to arbitrate only 
when arbitration has a large cost (or other) advantage over litigation.” 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or 
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 433, 435 
(2010). 
47. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628, 633 (1985). 
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judicial proceeding.”48 Proponents argue that this efficacy leads to lower 
costs for consumers, since the cost of individual disputes is limited by 
fewer procedural and evidentiary rules, and “is less disruptive of on-
going and future business dealings among the parties.”49 
Arbitration can certainly be less costly in addressing complex or 
large disputes, as the parties agree to eschew extensive discovery and 
evidentiary rules, as well as appellate review, while also relying on ro-
bust enforcement mechanisms.50 Enforcing arbitration clauses in ad-
hesion contracts, however, can significantly raise the cost of proceedings 
for consumers. These clauses often preclude access, absent the consent 
of the corporation, to the small claims court that would otherwise be 
best suited for the small sums typically under dispute.51 In addition, 
many arbitration clauses allow for cost-shifting, so a consumer may 
 
48. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate District at 22, Discover Bank v. John Szetela, 537 U.S. 1226 
(2003) (denying cert.) (No. 02-829), 2002 WL 32133742, at *22. 
49. Michael Hoenig & Linda M. Brown, Arbitration and Class Action Waivers 
Under Concepcion: Reason and Reasonableness Deflect Strident Attacks, 
68 Ark. L. Rev. 669, 679 (2015) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-542, at 3 
(1982)). At the same time, the Court has also held that efficiency is not 
necessarily the goal of enforcing arbitration agreements. In Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, the Court held that “[w]hen arbitrable and non-
arbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction” courts must enforce 
motions to compel arbitration, “even where the result would be the possibly 
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” 470 
U.S. 213, 216–17 (1985). 
50. It should also be noted that this Comment is concerned with binding 
arbitration clauses in domestic contracts, as distinct from such clauses in 
international commercial contracts. In international contracts, sophisticated 
parties do generally prefer binding arbitration, as such clauses prevent forum 
shopping and provide much greater certainty of enforcement than a foreign 
jurisdiction would. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 46, at 341 (showing 
that sophisticated parties prefer not to arbitrate domestic issues). 
51. Alderman, supra note 37, at 1250 (comparing the typical price of $100 in 
total to access small claims court, versus a possible $1000 daily cost of using 
an arbitrator). The CFPB study analyzed the difference in procedural costs 
and “noted that the fee for filing a case in Federal court is $350 plus a $50 
administrative fee—paid by the party filing suit, regardless of the amount 
being sought—and the fee for a small claims filing in Philadelphia Municipal 
Court ranges from $63 to $112.38. In arbitration, under the AAA consumer 
fee schedule that took effect March 1, 2013, the consumer pays a $200 
administrative fee, regardless of the amount of the claim and regardless of 
the party that filed the claim; in JAMS arbitrations, when a consumer 
initiates arbitration against the company, the consumer is required to pay a 
$250 fee.” Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32844. However, the CFPB 
found in its study that “most of the arbitration agreements contained a . . . 
‘carve-out,’ permitting either the consumer or both parties to file suit in 
small claims court.” Id. at 32842. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Future of Class-Action Waivers in Consumer Contract Arbitration 
Agreements after DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia 
621 
potentially bear the risk of the full cost of an unsuccessful dispute in 
arbitration.52 As the “mass production of arbitration clauses” has 
become an integral aspect of consumer transactions, consumer advo-
cates point to these costs and risks of mandatory arbitration as a 
significantly troubling aspect of form contracts.53 It is certainly true 
that class actions do not easily adapt to the “fast and efficient” nature 
of commercial arbitration, but as noted earlier, requiring a party to 
submit to arbitration, absent clear and unambiguous consent, is also 
not consistent with the practice of arbitration. Nor is it consistent with 
Congress’ clear intent in passing the FAA.54 Because the Supreme Court 
has essentially elided over the latter issue, both plaintiff and defendant 
lawyers continue to extensively litigate the former.55 
One way plaintiff lawyers fought back against mandatory arbi-
tration was by initiating class arbitration disputes.56 Consumer ad-
vocates argued that it was an effective way to mitigate the expense of 
arbitration, as well as the risk of cost shifting. At the same time, such 
action could hold corporations accountable, even when the damage to 
each consumer might have been minimal, as when Sprint allegedly 
wrongly charged roaming fees in the Miami market.57 While aggregation 
is not specifically forbidden, the FAA is silent on the issue. In practice, 
parties adopt class action procedures available in litigation, with the 
significant difference that in arbitration, class membership is limited to 
“those governed by similar arbitration agreements.”58 
 
52. “The Study found that many arbitration agreements permit the arbitrator 
to reallocate arbitration fees from one party to the other. About one-third 
of credit card arbitration agreements, one-fourth of checking account 
arbitration agreements, and half of payday loan arbitration agreements 
expressly permitted the arbitrator to shift arbitration costs to the 
consumer.” Id. at 32842. 
53. See generally Resnik, supra note 16 (discussing the diffusion of consumer 
rights as the Supreme Court gradually moved to enforce arbitration and 
class waiver clauses in consumer and employee contracts). 
54. See supra note 24. 
55. See Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 34 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Stolt-Nielsen, which found that class arbitration agreements 
require clear indication that parties agreed to class arbitration).  
56. Id. at 21–22 (recounting the development of class arbitration). 
57. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (explaining the impediment 
of arbitration clauses in a consumer lawsuit against Sprint). “The realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero 
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” DIRECTV, Inc. 
v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (2004)). 
58. Francisco Blavi & Gonzalo Vial, Class Actions in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 39 Fordham Int’l L.J. 791, 794 (2016). 
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In Southland Corp. v. Keating,59 the Court first considered the 
question of “whether arbitration under the federal Act is impaired when 
a class-action structure is imposed on the process by the state courts.”60 
Although the Court noted it was an issue of first impression, it held 
that the question of class arbitration had not been contested on federal 
grounds, and was for California to decide in this instance.61 Class 
arbitration continued as a niche practice, however, largely confined to 
California courts, until the Supreme Court decided Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle62 in 2003.63 In that case, arising out of South 
Carolina, the Court determined that if the arbitration agreement did 
not “clearly preclude class action” the appointed arbitrator would 
determine whether to certify the class as the FAA “did not foreclose 
class action.”64 Corporations sought to push back against the post-
Green Tree explosion of class arbitrations by inserting explicit class 
action waivers in all mandatory arbitration clauses.65 In response, 
California courts began to invalidate such waivers on public policy 
grounds.66 In 2005, the California Supreme Court stepped into the fray 
and held that state courts could find a class action waiver to be 
unconscionable “when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”67 This 
so-called Discover Bank rule for unconscionability was affirmed by the 
9th Circuit, and lower courts began to find class action waivers to be 
invalid under this unconscionability test.68 
 
59. 465 U.S. 1 (1983). 
60. Id. at 3. 
61. See Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 24 (explaining how the Supreme 
Court reached its decision in Southland). 
62. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
63. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: 
Empirical Evidence, 41 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 813, 835 (2008) (discussing 
the rise of class arbitration following the Supreme Court’s decision in Green 
Tree). 
64. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 444 (syllabus). 
65. See Drahozal, supra note 63, at 838 (illustrating the amount of class action 
waivers in arbitration clauses). 
66. The California Court of Appeal refused to enforce a credit card class action 
waiver on the grounds that “it violates public policy by granting Discover a 
‘get out of jail free’ card while compromising important consumer rights.” 
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (2002). 
67. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
68. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
“[w]here an arbitration agreement is concerned, the agreement is 
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While consumer plaintiffs lawyers saw the unconscionability test as 
a winning argument, corporate entities were determined to abrogate 
California courts’ public policy reasoning against class-action waivers.69 
In his petition to the Supreme Court on behalf of Discover Bank, future 
Chief Justice Roberts argued that Szetela v. Discover was in direct 
conflict with the “Court’s cases emphasizing the Act’s ‘central purpose’ 
of enforcing arbitration agreements ‘according to their terms.’”70 
Furthermore, he argued that “state laws in conflict with the Act’s 
strong policy in favor of arbitration must give way . . . [as] the Court 
of Appeal’s couching its ruling on ‘unconscionability’ grounds [does not] 
blunt the Arbitration Act’s preemptive force.”71 The Court declined to 
accept the Discover petition, however, and the subsequent Discover 
Bank unconscionability rule remained unchallenged for a few years. 
After Roberts ascended to the Court as Chief Justice in 2005, 
however, advocates renewed their push to strengthen corporations’ 
ability to impose class-action waivers.72 It is against this backdrop that 
the Roberts Court has issued a series of rulings, starting with Stolz-
Nielson in 2010 and culminating with DIRECTV in 2015, that have 
severely curtailed consumers’ ability to bring class-actions under 
mandatory arbitration clauses. 
II. The Disappearance of Class-Arbitration 
In 2010, the Court accepted Stoltz-Nielson. As in Bazzle, the cor-
poration was challenging an arbitral class-action award where the 
arbitration clause was silent on the issue of class aggregation. This time 
however, the outcome was decidedly different. Justice Alito, writing for 
the majority, determined that the issue was “ripe for judicial review” 
 
unconscionable unless the arbitration remedy contains a ‘modicum of 
bilaterality’”) (citation omitted); Josephine Lee, California Consumer 
Contracts After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 15 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 
219, 221 (2014) (acknowledging that after Discover Bank, lower courts began 
applying an unconscionability test and finding class arbitration waivers 
invalid). But see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: 
California Courts Lure Plaintiffs’ Lawyers (but Undermine Federal 
Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58 Bus. Law. 1289, 1290–91 (2003) 
(noting that state courts often find “no-class action clauses” to be not 
unconscionable in federal arbitration law). 
69. See Szetela, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1096 (holding that a credit card class action 
waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable). 
70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 21. 
71. Id. at 5, 12. 
72. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (investigating a “coalition of 
credit card companies and retailers” that moved to “block class actions”). 
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and held that “[i]mposing class arbitration on parties who have not 
agreed to authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).”73 In holding that class actions could only be 
allowed when explicitly permitted by the arbitration clause, the Court 
“substantially undercut both the Court’s earlier decision in Bazzle and 
the burgeoning growth of class arbitrations.”74 In her dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens, dryly noted that the 
issue was in fact not ripe for judicial review, and that the Court was 
substituting its judgment for that of experienced arbitrators.75 
Stoltz-Nielson limited consumers’ ability to bring class actions when 
the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue, but courts still had 
discretion to apply the Discover Bank unconscionability rule. In 2011, 
a coalition of credit card companies and retailers presented a case that 
was carefully selected to knock out courts’ ability to refuse to enforce 
class-action waivers under public policy objections.76 In accepting 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court had the opportunity to 
address the public policy exceptions Chief Justice Roberts had argued 
against on behalf of Discover Bank in 2002. Justice Scalia wrote the 
plurality opinion (Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion) 
in which the Court upended the Discover Bank rule “as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”77 In holding that the 
 
73. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 663 (2010). 
74. Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 22. 
75. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 688 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Justice 
Sotomayor took no part in the proceedings). An ongoing critique of the 
Court’s ruling is that the Court failed to understand the sophisticated nature 
of arbitration. See Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 39–42 (discussing the 
Court’s failure to consider various nuances of arbitration proceedings). 
76. In its investigation, the New York Times found that AT&T followed a 
specific strategy in its arbitration clause in order to “try to tempt the 
Supreme Court to wade into the fray.” Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra 
note 1. This strategy was to include (unusually) consumer-friendly provisions 
in its arbitration clause, such as denying AT&T reimbursement of its 
attorney’s fees, and requiring AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum and 
claimant’s attorney fees, if the customer received an arbitration award 
greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer. AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 338 (2011). See Hoenig & Brown, supra note 49, 
at 671 (providing an overview of Discover Bank v. Superior Court); 
Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32842 (noting that “a significant share 
of arbitration agreements across almost all markets did not address 
attorney’s fees”). 
77. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343. Justice Thomas concurred with the ruling, but 
on the grounds that § 2 of the FAA requires “enforcement of an agreement 
to arbitrate unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the 
formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual 
mistake.” Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia reasoned that 
Congress never intended the FAA to encompass class arbitration, since 
class arbitration “requires procedural formality” that Congress likely 
did not want an arbitrator to define.78 Although Born and Salas note 
that the result of Concepcion was likely correct, they expressed concern 
that with Scalia’s “misconceived and dangerous” reasoning that the 
FAA only encompasses arbitration as it was practiced in 1924, the 
Court “abandoned the conception of ‘arbitration’ . . . as a process for 
resolving a wide variety of disputes, using an equally wide range of 
procedures, depending on the parties’ individual needs and 
objectives.”79 
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Concepcion, in which he was 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, took issue with 
Scalia’s narrow reading of the purpose of the FAA. Justice Breyer 
contended that the Discover Bank rule fell directly within the Act’s § 
2 savings clause, and was therefore “consistent with the basic ‘purpose 
behind’ the act . . . [which is to] ‘ensur[e] judicial enforcement’ of 
arbitration agreements” that are valid and enforceable.80 Justice Breyer 
noted that the FAA permits courts to refuse to enforce arbitration 
agreements on grounds that exist “for the revocation of any contract.”81 
He thereby disagreed with the majority that allowing state courts to 
enforce contract law against arbitration did not, per se, impinge on the 
purpose of the FAA, and further, that Congress did not intend to 
guarantee certain particular procedural advantages, as Scalia argued. 
Instead, the Court’s focus should have been on the Act’s stated 
objective, which “was to secure the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to 
arbitrate,” regardless of the agreed-upon procedure.82 As such, Justice 
Breyer argued that class actions were “consistent with the use of 
arbitration,”83 as the decisive factor was that “California law sets forth 
certain circumstances in which ‘class action waivers’ in any contract are 
unenforceable.”84 Therefore, the California law met the FAA’s 
requirement that arbitration be treated equally as other contract law. 
With the narrow majority Concepcion ruling, however, the Court 
 
78. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349. 
79. Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 22; see Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350 
(discussing weaknesses of arbitration as a dispute resolution process). 
80. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)). 
81. Id. at 357 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) (emphasis added). 
82. Id. at 360. 
83. Id. at 362. 
84. Id. at 357. 
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delivered a decisive blow against allowing class actions into arbi-
tration.85 
Given Justice Breyer’s careful discussion of the purpose of the FAA 
and its savings clause in his Concepcion dissent, commentators noted 
with surprise that he wrote the majority opinion in DIRECTV, which 
served to uphold Concepcion.86 Most of that commentary suggests that 
Breyer’s opinion indicates that any attempt to protect class arbitration 
is now doomed before the Supreme Court.87 A closer analysis, however, 
suggests that Breyer was more concerned about the California Court of 
Appeal’s clear attempt to circumvent the recent Concepcion holding, 
than in further stricturing class-arbitration. Furthermore, Breyer’s 
opinion is consistent with his Concepcion dissent in that he argued in 
both cases that California courts must treat an arbitration clause the 
same way as they would treat any other contract. 
DIRECTV v. Imburgia arose from a dispute over the company’s 
service agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration clause with 
a class action waiver.88 The waiver included language “that if the ‘law 
of your state’ makes the waiver . . . unenforceable, then the entire 
 
85. In addition to forestalling class actions on contractual and unconscionability 
grounds with Stoltz-Nielson and Concepcion, a plurality of the Court ruled 
in 2013 that courts cannot invalidate a contractual class waiver when the 
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim might 
preclude a vindication of federal statutory rights. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–12 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring; 
Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting; Sotomayor, J., recused herself 
as she served on the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Panel that ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs). 
86. See Ellen Meriwether, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Rule 23 Amendments: 
Are Class Actions on the Precipice?, 30 Antitrust Magazine 23 (2016) 
(noting that without Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court may reach a different 
conclusion concerning the appropriateness of class action bans in arbitration 
agreements); Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A 
Prognosis, 65 Emory L.J. 1569, 1593 (2016) (criticizing Supreme Court 
Justices for not joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in DIRECTV); Ronald 
Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Rebuke California Courts (Again) for 
Refusal to Enforce Arbitration Agreement, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 14, 2015, 
2:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2015/12/opinion-analysis-justices-rebuke-california-courts-again-for-refusal-
to-enforce-arbitration-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/M32B-CNVK] (sug-
gesting that the lower court’s attempt to avoid Concepcion in DIRECTV 
may have swayed Breyer to change his position). 
87. See Meriwether, supra note 86 (explaining that the Roberts Court 
continuously rejected arguments “that class action bans in arbitration 
agreements violated state public policy”); Szalai, supra note 9, at 2 
(arguing “that the Court’s DIRECTV decision turns arbitration law 
completely upside down”). 
88. DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 462, 464 (2015). 
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arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable.’”89 When, in 2008, customers 
brought a class action in California state court against DIRECTV over 
early termination fees, DIRECTV sought to have the arbitration clause 
enforced,90 but Discover Bank controlled, which rendered DIRECTV’s 
arbitration agreement unenforceable under California law.91 By 2011, 
however, the Concepcion ruling had overturned the Discover Bank rule. 
Nonetheless, in 2012, the Court of Appeals held that “the law of 
California would find the . . . waiver unenforceable.”92 The California 
court reasoned that the clause the parties agreed to referred to “the law 
of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the 
FAA.”93 In doing so, the court applied sections of California’s 
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), instead of the Discover 
Bank rule, to render the class waiver unenforceable.94 The Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the relevant sections of the CLRA 
embodied the Discover Bank rule, and thus would be preempted under 
federal law.95 The court, however, “reasoned that just as the parties 
were free in their contracts to refer to the laws of different States or 
different nations, so too were they free to refer to California law as it 
would have been without this Court’s holding invalidating the Discover 
Bank rule.”96 Finally, the California court found that “the law of your 
state” was a specific provision that governed the general arbitration 
provision, and that the phrase was ambiguous and should therefore be 
constructed against the drafter.97 
The California court’s attempt to narrow the Concepcion holding 
by allowing parties a valid choice of invalid law is what Justice Breyer 
seemed most concerned about in writing for the majority. The Justice 
began his commentary by noting that California courts are bound by 
Concepcion, and stating that “[l]ower court judges are certainly free to 
note their disagreement with a decision of this Court. But the 
‘Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from 
federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to 
 
89. Id. at 466 (citation omitted). 
90. Id. 
91. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2012 WL 7657788 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 26, 2012). 
92. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467. 
93. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 4th 338, 344 (2014). 
94. Id. at 342. 
95. Id. at 344. 
96. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. 
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recognize the superior authority of its source.’”98 In particular, Justice 
Breyer noted that “the view that state law retains independent force 
even after it has been authoritatively invalidated by this Court is one 
courts are unlikely . . . to apply in other contexts.”99 At the same time, 
the Court acknowledged that “California courts are the ultimate 
authority on [California contract] law” but only if their decisions “rest[] 
upon ‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’”100 The California court’s distinction, where parties can 
choose to be bound by invalid law, did not put “arbitration contracts 
‘on equal footing with all other contracts’” and therefore did not “give 
‘due regard . . . to the federal policy favoring arbitration.’”101 Because 
the California courts reached a conclusion on contract interpretation 
that would only be applicable to arbitration, the Court found the Court 
of Appeal’s interpretation discriminatory toward arbitration, and thus 
preempted by the FAA.102 This is entirely consistent with Breyer’s 
Concepcion dissent, where he argued that class arbitration should be 
allowed when treated the same as any other contract.103 
After presenting the Court’s opinion that the “California courts 
would not interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts the same 
way,” Justice Breyer helpfully labeled the reasons 1–6 as to why the 
Court reached that holding.104 Three of the reasons focused on federal 
supremacy, as outlined above. The other three focused on the fact that 
the clause was not ambiguous, and that California courts would not 
have reached the same interpretation in cases not involving arbitration. 
Therefore, the Court held that California’s application of the 
“antidrafter canon” was not appropriate in this case.105 
It is interesting to note that in the oral arguments, Chief Justice 
Roberts also did not seem troubled by the California court’s contention 
that the contract was ambiguous. Instead, he obliquely referred back to 
the argument he raised on behalf of Discover Bank, that courts are 
generally obliged to enforce a strong pro-arbitration policy.106 The Chief 
 
98. Id. at 468 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 357 (1990)). 
99. Id. at 470. 
100. Id. at 468 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
101. Id. at 471 (citations omitted). 
102. Id. 
103. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011). 
104. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469–71. 
105. Id. at 465. 
106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 5. 
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Justice expressed a concern that the California court’s ruling instead 
displayed an “unexpressed” hostility towards arbitration.107 
That focus on the California court’s hostility to arbitration is re-
flected in the written opinion, where Justice Breyer seemed content to 
merely reaffirm the Court’s “pro-arbitration” policy, as well as remind 
California courts of the Supremacy clause.108 Indeed, as one com-
mentator noted, Breyer’s focus on “the law of your state” as unam-
biguous kept the Court from creating even more problematic arbitration 
law.109 If the Court had accepted that the clause was ambiguous, or 
accepted DIRECTV’s argument that that the FAA “requires a pre-
sumption in favor of arbitration,” that would have served to upend the 
contra proferentem rule in favor of the corporations who routinely draft 
these clauses.110 Justice Breyer chose instead to dismiss the California 
court’s contention that the contract should be construed against the 
drafter, by stating that the term “the laws of your state” unam-
biguously refers to valid state law, and that California courts would not 
interpret that phrase to include invalid laws in “cases not involving 
arbitration.”111 Indeed, the Justice underscored the narrowness of the 
decision by declaring that the Court’s holding went “no further than 
present well-established law.”112 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg took issue with the Court’s asser-
tion that this decision created no new law. Instead, she posited that the 
ruling was “a dangerous first” that interpreted the arbitration clause in 
favor of the drafter, in other words, upending the contra proferentem 
rule.113 As discussed above however, it seems clear that the holding was 
narrowly constructed to avoid doing just that. Nonetheless, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that the clause was unambiguously constructed in 
favor of the consumers, and was interpreted in favor of the drafters. 
 
107. See Mann, supra note 86 (summarizing Justice Breyer’s suggestion to lower 
courts to follow Supreme Court rulings and the Supremacy Clause). Chief 
Justice Roberts demonstrated his concern by asking “what could be more 
hostile to the FAA than to interpret a phrase that says nothing about the 
FAA to dispense with our holdings about . . . what the FAA has to say.” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 
463 (2015) (No. 14-462). 
108. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467. 
109. Klass, supra note 11. 
110. Id. (explaining that the contra proferentem rule requires that an ambiguous 
clause be interpreted against the drafter, and that, had the Court ruled that 
the FAA requires an ambiguous clause to be interpreted in favor of 
arbitration, it would have set a dangerous precedent for contract law). 
111. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 465. 
112. Id. at 471. 
113. Id. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Yet, when written and originally agreed upon, the clause meant that 
the customer’s “home state laws” govern the relationship and, therefore, 
the CLRA controlled contracts agreed upon in California.114 Justice 
Ginsburg sought to distinguish the applicability of the CLRA post–
Concepcion by arguing that Concepcion “held only that a State cannot 
compel a party to engage in class arbitration when the controlling agree-
ment unconditionally prohibits class procedures.”115 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reads as a well-reasoned analysis of the 
Court’s many misadventures with the FAA, especially in AMEX and 
Concepcion, that “deprive consumers of effective relief”—particularly 
concerning when the parties may not have consented to be bound.116 
While a principled stand for consumers, the dissent does not squarely 
address the issue most troubling to the majority: the California 
Appellate Court sought to essentially ignore the Concepcion ruling by 
treating the arbitration clause differently than it would other contracts. 
This Comment posits that may be the likely reason that Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent only received the vote of Justice Sotomayor.117 
As discussed above, it seems clear that the Court was more con-
cerned about the California’s imaginative use of “law of your state” to 
circumvent the Court’s Concepcion holding than in reaffirming, or 
strengthening, class action waivers. Perhaps, therefore, the Justices 
simply did not view DIRECTV as the appropriate case to reverse its 
own rulings from just a few years earlier, rather than seizing the oppor-
tunity to turn “arbitration law completely upside down.”118 This Com-
ment suggests that the former is the likelier reason Justice Kagan, who 
wrote the dissent in AMEX, joined Justice Breyer, the author of the 
Concepcion dissent, in the DIRECTV opinion upholding Concepcion.119 
Despite the hue and cry, therefore, the DIRECTV ruling may in 
fact mark the end of the Court’s move to narrow consumer rights in 
contracts with “powerful economic enterprises,” rather than marking 
 
114. Id. at 473–75. 
115. Id. at 473. 
116. Id. at 476. 
117. Justice Thomas also dissented from the majority, but did so on the grounds 
that the FAA does not apply to state court proceedings—a viewpoint that 
had not been seriously argued since Southland. See Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Congress intended 
to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.”). 
118. Szalai, supra note 9 (manuscript at 2). 
119. See Klonoff, supra note 86, at 1593 (2016) (noting that a “particularly 
troubling feature of DIRECTV” is that Justices Kagan and Breyer “refused 
to read Concepcion narrowly” and did not join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent). 
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the end of class-arbitration.120 Indeed, one commentator suggested that 
“the outcome of DIRECTV should serve as a demarcation, a sort of 
tipping point, for consumer advocate groups.”121 This Comment posits 
that such a demarcation has already been created. In addition to not 
creating new law, the Court also did not publicly admonish the 
California Court of Appeal for its attempt to limit Concepcion, as it 
rebuked and summarily reversed the 6th Circuit in a per curiam opinion 
issued that same day.122 The absence of a “pointed rebuke” may very 
well signal that the Court is open to revisiting the issue of class action 
waivers in the near future.123 
Of course, such a shift may also depend on who will eventually 
replace the late Justice Scalia.124 With the author of the narrow major-
ities in Concepcion and AMEX no longer on the bench, however, it may 
be that the Robert’s Court could very well reconsider its current “pro-
arbitration” outlook, especially given the current and expected numer-
ous challenges to the CFPB’s proposed rules on arbitration clauses and 
class waivers. 
III. The Possible Reemergence of Class Arbitration 
after DIRECTV 
The CFPB’s Congressional mandate includes the ability to conduct 
a comprehensive empirical study of the use of arbitration clauses, and 
subsequently propose rules to address relevant issues.125 The CFPB  
120. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
121. Angelica Sanchez Vega, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: Supreme Court Holds 
California Court’s Interpretation Preempted by Federal Arbitration Act, 91 
Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 70, 77 (2016). 
122. White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 458 (2015) (pointedly stating that the 6th 
Circuit, “despite the substantial deference it must accord to state-court 
rulings in federal habeas proceedings . . . contravene[d] controlling precedents 
from this Court, and it is now necessary to reverse the Court of Appeals by 
this summary disposition”). 
123. See Mann, supra note 86 (suggesting that the majority’s opinion in 
DIRECTV was not as harsh as it seemed at first analysis, as the decision 
was not unanimous and the Court did not rebuke the 9th Circuit for 
“intransigence”). 
124. Ellen Meriwether, supra note 86, at 27 (“[T]he future of modern Rule 23 
may well depend on whether Scalia’s replacement shares similar views on 
the relative importance of the class action mechanism.”); Klonoff, supra 
note 86, at 1599 (“It is also possible that Concepcion, American Express, 
and DIRECTV could be judicially or legislatively overruled in the next 
decade as a result of changes in the composition of the Supreme Court or in 
the makeup of Congress.”). 
125. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1028(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2004 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
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published its study on arbitration in 2015.126 As discussed in Part II of 
this Comment, the study found significant issues with consumers’ 
awareness that they were under binding arbitration, as well as few 
instances of consumers bringing arbitration disputes.127 Therefore, the 
CFPB determined “that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are being 
widely used to prevent consumers from seeking relief from legal 
violations on a class basis.”128 
Pursuant to its findings and mandate, the CFPB proposed rules 
limit the use of “pre-dispute arbitration agreements by covered pro-
viders of consumer financial products and services . . . [as] it would 
prohibit providers from using a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to 
block consumer class actions in court and would require providers to 
insert language into their arbitration agreements reflecting this limita-
tion.”129 The public commenting period for these proposed rules ended 
on August 22, 2016.130 At the time of publication it is unclear whether 
the rules have been affected by President Trump’s recent executive 
orders.131 Furthermore, the Wells Fargo sham accounts scandal has 
thrust the issue of forced consumer arbitration back into national 
headlines.132 In response, Democratic law-makers have vowed action, 
 
§ 5518) (“The Bureau shall conduct a study of, and shall provide a report 
to Congress concerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of 
any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection 
with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.”). 
126. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to 
Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a) (2015), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH6L-BAZL]. 
127. See id. at 11 (listing the study’s empirical findings, as related to consumer 
understanding and awareness). 
128. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32829. 
129. Id. at 3–4. 
130. Proposed Rule: Arbitration Agreements, CFPB, http://www.consumer 
finance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development/ 
arbitration-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/NX23-F9GA] (last visited Jan. 8, 
2017).  
131. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Trump Administration Issues Regulatory Freeze; 
Application to CFPB Uncertain, CFPB Monitor (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2017/01/23/trump-administration-issues-
regulatory-freeze-application-to-cfpb-uncertain/ [https://perma.cc/95PC-
4QJ4]. 
132. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Killing Sham Accounts 
by Using Arbitration, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-killing-sham-account-suits-
by-using-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/S7TS-HNJ3] (describing the 
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thus affecting the political expediency of rescinding these consumer 
protections.133 If unaffected, the rules on arbitration would essentially 
revive the California Discover Bank rule disallowing class action wai-
vers, but on a national basis. Even if the rules go into force however, 
there is no doubt that they will be challenged. 
Because the CFPB is a financial regulatory body, these rules are 
limited to financial services. Nevertheless, advocates who hope to 
expand prohibition against class aggregation waivers, were encouraged 
by the agency’s action.134 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act also autho-
rized the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate arbitration 
agreements in contracts between consumers and securities broker-deal-
ers or investment advisors when “in the public interest and for the 
protection of consumers.”135 Thus, Congress revisited the Wilko Court’s 
concerns over allowing arbitration claims under the Securities Act. In 
addition, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits arbitration agreements as part 
of mortgage loans, as well as in civil whistleblower retaliation actions.136 
 
bank’s strategy to force affected customers into arbitration by arguing that 
the arbitration clauses customers agreed to when opening legitimate accounts 
also apply to sham accounts opened in their names). 
133. See Brown and Sherman Introduce Bill to Help Wells Fargo’s Victims Get 
Their Day in Court, Sherrod Brown: Senator for Ohio (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-and-
sherman-introduce-bill-to-help-wells-fargos-victims-get-their-day-in-court 
[https://perma.cc/9256-2GVT]. 
134. While encouraging, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2009 marked the 
end of Congressional action to reform arbitration. Multiple attempts by 
Democrats in the House and Senate to pass an Arbitration Fairness Act have 
failed since then. Furthermore, Donald Trump, the new Republican 
President, has pledged to essentially dismantle Dodd-Frank. The Republican 
House leadership is also calling for “replacing Dodd-Frank with new rules 
that ease up on . . . consumer protection laws.” Billy House & Kevin Cirilli, 
Trump’s Dodd-Frank Plan Will Be Early Test of Republican Unity, 
Bloomberg (May 19, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
politics/articles/2016-05-19/trump-s-dodd-frank-plan-will-be-early-test-of-
republican-unity [https://perma.cc/H5KD-KKFQ]. The House leadership 
has also allowed “a Republican-backed provision to ban CFPB funding for 
regulating arbitration agreements” in its appropriations bill for the upcoming 
fiscal year. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB’s Arbitration Proposal Draws 13,000 
Comments, Wall St. J. (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/cfpbs-arbitration-proposal-draws-13-000-comments-1471983139 
[https://perma.cc/K6QF-JQYU]. Thus, the future of the CFPB itself may 
rest on the outcome of the 2016 election, just as much its rules may rest on 
the as-yet unappointed 9th Justice. 
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(o), 80b-5(f) (2012). 
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639c(e), 1514A(e)) (2012) (“No predispute arbitration 
agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration 
of a dispute arising under this section.”). 
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In each instance, the CFPB cites a public policy justification for ban-
ning class action waivers, which Justice Breyer noted in his Concepcion 
dissent was valid under the FAA savings clause.137 
As noted earlier, the future of class action waivers largely depends 
on who becomes the 9th Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as what 
transpires under the Trump administration. Nonetheless, Justices 
Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer have all indicated that they 
take the issues of consumer consent and ability to vindicate rights as 
integral aspects of the FAA, and that class arbitration is an important 
avenue for protecting those rights.138 Despite the lopsided DIRECTV 
decision, these four Justices could very well seek to uphold limitations 
on class-action waivers in future cases.139 
Conclusion 
Commentators point to DIRECTV as a definitive showing of the 
Court’s unwavering “pro-arbitration” stance at the expense of both 
consumers’ rights to legal recourse, as well as basic tenets of contract 
law.140 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her fiery dissent: “[T]his Court has 
again expanded the scope of the FAA, further degrading the rights of 
consumers and further insulating already powerful economic entities 
 
137. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the Court wrongly held “that the federal Act pre-
empts the rule of state law” in that case). 
138. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he FAA conceived of arbitration 
as a ‘method of resolving disputes’—a way of using tailored and streamlined 
procedures to facilitate redress of injuries . . . . In the hands of today’s 
majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite—a 
mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims 
and insulate wrongdoers from liability. The Court thus undermines the 
FAA no less than it does the Sherman Act and other federal statutes 
providing rights of action”); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (describing the Act’s purpose as “one of ‘ensur[ing] judicial 
enforcement’ of arbitration agreements”); DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. 
Ct. 462, 473 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (urging the enforcement of 
arbitration provisions in accordance with the terms of the contract, and 
emphasizing the importance of consent, not coercion). 
139. It should be noted, however, that the Court could refuse to enforce the 
CFPB rules over questions of administrative power, which is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
140. See Klonoff, supra note 86, at 1593 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
DIRECTV and characterizing her argument as “very credible and 
principled”); Szalai, supra note 9 (manuscript at 1–2) (commenting on the 
“defective” nature of DIRECTV). 
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from liability for unlawful acts.”141 However, DIRECTV seems more a 
culmination of the Court’s misunderstanding and misapplication of the 
FAA against consumers in adhesion contracts, than a further stricture 
on class-arbitration.142 Given the acknowledgement of such a disastrous 
history of applying the FAA by four Justices currently on the bench, 
along with the CFPB’s unambiguous Congressional mandate to 
regulate consumer contracts, it is just as likely that DIRECTV could 
be the last case to follow the Stolz-Nielson precedent of severely 
curtailing class arbitration. 
The financial industry is decrying the CFPB rules as a “class action 
expansion” rule that ignores the benefits of arbitration, and would all 
but ensure its demise.143 Far from spelling the “end of arbitration,” 
however, if the Court were to uphold the CFPB’s rules against class-
action waivers, the effect could be instead to reinforce both public and 
corporate confidence in arbitration as an effective and equitable practice 
of private law that squarely rests on parties’ consent.144 Practitioners 
and advocates can only hope that the Supreme Court will seek to 
correct its fundamental misunderstanding of arbitration and the FAA, 
as reflected in the Stoltz-Nielson line of cases. The likely challenges to 
the CFPB rules may provide the Court with an early opportunity to 
do just that, nearly 100 years after the FAA was ratified. 
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